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We show that equity market liberalizations, on average, lead to a one percent increase in annual 
real economic growth over a five-year period. The effect is robust to alternative definitions of 
liberalization and does not reflect variation in the world business cycle. The effect also remains 
intact when liberalization is instrumented with quality of institutions-variables that explain 
liberalization but not growth and when a growth opportunity measure is included in the regression. 
Capital account liberalization has a less robust effect on growth than equity market liberalization 
has. Other simultaneous reforms only partially account for the effect. Finally, we examine why some 
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One of the most fundamental national policy decisions of the past 25 years has been the
ﬁnancial liberalization of equity markets across the world. Equity market liberalizations
give foreign investors the opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities and domestic
investors the right to transact in foreign equity securities. We ﬁnd that equity market liber-
alizations increase subsequent average annual real economic growth by about 1%. One might
think that ﬁnancial liberalizations may be subsumed by other variables that are common-
ly used in the economic growth literature [see Barro (1997a) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995)]. We ﬁnd that this is not the case.
From a neoclassical perspective, our results are to be expected. Improved risk sharing
post-liberalization should decrease the cost of equity capital (see, for example, Bekaert and
Harvey (2000)) and increase investment. When markets are imperfect, equity market liberal-
ization may have strong eﬀects as well. Financing constraints (see e.g. Hubbard (1998) and
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998)), make external ﬁnance more costly than internal ﬁnance,
and cause investment to be sensitive to cash ﬂows. Equity market liberalization directly
reduces ﬁnancing constraints in the sense that more foreign capital becomes available, and
foreign investors may insist on better corporate governance which indirectly reduces the
wedge between internal ﬁnance and external ﬁnance. Hence, the cost of capital may go
down because of improved risk sharing or because of the reduction in ﬁnancing constraints
or both. Moreover, better corporate governance and investor protection should promote
ﬁnancial development (La Porta et al. (1997)) and hence growth (King and Levine (1993),
for example).
From at least two alternative perspectives, our results may be more surprising. First,
alternative theories do not imply positive growth eﬀects after ﬁnancial liberalization, for
example, because of reduced precautionary savings (Devereux and Smith (1994)) or because
informational asymmetries prevent foreign capital to be proﬁtably invested (Stiglitz (2000)).
Second, a rapidly growing literature on the growth eﬀects of capital account liberalization
ﬁnds mixed results (see Eichengreen (2002) for a survey).
We conduct a number of empirical exercises that instill conﬁdence in our results. First,
1our results survive an extensive number of econometric robustness experiments, including
controlling for world business cycle variation. Second, our results are robust to alternative
measurements of the liberalization variable. The use of a homogeneous measure of interna-
tional openness, focusing on equity markets, may explain why our results are so diﬀerent
from the capital account openness literature. We conﬁrm that the standard IMF measure of
whether the capital account is free of restrictions (see Rodrik (1998) and Kraay (1998)), does
not give rise to a robust growth eﬀect. When capital account restrictions are more ﬁnely
measured, as in Quinn (1997) and Edwards (2001), there does appear to be a growth eﬀect,
although it is more fragile than the equity market liberalization eﬀect we ﬁnd (see Arteta,
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2003)).
Third, we take seriously the possibility that liberalization may be a strategic decision
correlated with growth opportunities. However, growth opportunities do not explain the lib-
eralization decision. Moreover, when we instrument liberalization with variables measuring
the quality of local institutions, which explain liberalization but not growth, the liberaliza-
tion eﬀect remains intact.
Fourth, our growth eﬀect is large and it is unlikely that it can be fully ascribed to
equity market liberalization. Most importantly, equity market liberalization may coincide
with other reforms that improve the growth prospects of the country. We closely investigate
several possibilities such as macro reforms, ﬁnancial reforms, legal reforms (including reforms
regarding insider trading) and the coincidence of equity market liberalizations with post-
banking crisis reforms.
Fifth, it is unlikely that the liberalization eﬀect is the same in all liberalizing countries.
We relate the heterogeneity of the growth eﬀect to the comprehensiveness of reforms, the
legal environment, investment conditions, and the degree of ﬁnancial development.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes our data, the summary
statistics and the econometric framework. The third part of the paper examines the role
of equity market liberalization as a determinant of economic growth. The fourth section
investigates the endogeneity issue. The ﬁfth section explores whether the equity market
liberalization eﬀect can be accounted for by macroeconomic and other regulatory reforms.
2The sixth section sheds light on why the growth response to ﬁnancial liberalization diﬀers
across countries. Some concluding remarks are oﬀered in the ﬁnal section.
2 Data and model framework
2.1 Equity market liberalizations
Our tests involve regressions of real per capita GDP growth on an equity market liberalization
indicator. These regressions have both time-series and cross-sectional dimensions. Table 1
contains the descriptions and sources of all the variables used in the paper.
Perhaps the most important variable in our paper is the indicator variable, Oﬃcial Eq-
uity Market Liberalization. This variable is based on Bekaert and Harvey’s (2002) detailed
chronology of important ﬁnancial, economic and political events in many developing coun-
tries. The variable takes the value of one when it is possible for foreign portfolio investors
to own the equity of a particular market and zero otherwise. We augmented this analysis
with liberalization dates for ﬁve developed countries: Japan, Iceland, Malta, New Zealand
and Spain (see Appendix A).
Our analysis of robustness of the liberalization eﬀect considers two alternative measures
of ﬁnancial liberalization. The ﬁrst measure, First Sign, is based on the earliest of three
possibilities: a launching of a country fund, an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) an-
nouncement and an Oﬃcial Liberalization. It might be possible for a foreign investor to
access the market through a country fund well before foreigners are allowed to directly
transact in the local equity market. For example, consider the case of Thailand. Bekaert
and Harvey (2002) date the Oﬃcial Liberalization in September 1987. This was the ﬁrst
month of operation of the Thai Alien Board which allowed foreigners to directly transact in
Thai securities. However, foreigners could indirectly access the Thai market earlier. In July
1985, the Bangkok Fund Ltd. was launched on the London Stock Exchange and in December
1986, Morgan Stanley launched the Thailand Fund. Thailand announced its ﬁrst ADR in
January 1991. So, for our analysis, the Oﬃcial Liberalization is dated in 1987 whereas the
First Sign date is 1985.
3We also consider a measure of capital account liberalization based on IMF information.
The dates for the Oﬃcial Liberalization, ﬁrst country fund, and ﬁrst ADR announcement
are presented in Appendix A. All other data are discussed when they are introduced in the
analysis.
Our regression analysis uses four diﬀerent country samples which are determined by data
availability. Economic growth rates, the basic control variables and the Oﬃcial Liberaliza-
tion indicator are available for all samples. Samples I and II, our largest, include 95 and 75
countries, respectively, and employ primarily macroeconomic and demographic data. Sam-
ples III and IV, on the other hand, include 50 and 28 countries, respectively, and employ, in
addition to the macroeconomic and demographic information, data describing the state of
banking and equity market development in each country.
2.2 Unconditional eﬀects of liberalization
Table 2 presents some summary analysis of some of the main variables in our analysis. We
analyze the data from two perspectives. In the ﬁrst two columns, we consider means of the
variables ﬁve-years before and after equity market liberalizations. However, for real GDP
growth, we also examine three and seven-year intervals. In the third and four columns, we
look at the diﬀerence in means between countries that are fully liberalized and countries that
were never liberalized (segmented countries).
Using a sample of liberalizing countries, we ﬁnd that the real annual GDP growth rate is
more than 1% higher in the post-liberalization period for all intervals. There is a much sharp-
er diﬀerence in growth between fully liberalized countries and those that did not experience
a liberalization, of approximately 2.2%.
The next group of variables will serve as control variables in the growth regressions, as
determinants of steady-state GDP. The control variables experience changes after liberal-
ization that would indicate a higher steady state GDP with the most striking diﬀerences
for the fully liberalized and segmented countries. In each case, there are highly signiﬁcant
diﬀerences. The never liberalized countries have: lower secondary school enrollment, lower
life expectancy, and higher population growth. The size of the government sector is smaller
4in the segmented sample.
The last panels of the table consider variables that appear in later sections and we will
discuss them then. Importantly, the diﬀerences in means reported in Table 2 only summarize
the data. In order to assess whether growth increases after equity market liberalizations, it
is necessary to conduct a multivariate regression analysis.
2.3 Econometric framework







yi,t+j i =1 ,...,N (1)
where yi,t = ln(GDPi,t
POPi,t/GDPi,t−1
POPi,t−1) and N is the number of countries in our sample. Let the
initial level of log GDP per capita be denoted as Qit and the country’s long-run (steady
state) per capita GDP as Q∗
i. Taking a ﬁrst-order approximation to the neoclassical growth
model [see e.g. Mankiw (1995)], we can derive: yi,t+k,k = −λ[Qit −Q∗
i], where λ is a positive
convergence parameter. The literature often implicitly models Q∗
i as a linear function of a
number of structural variables such as the initial level of human capital. Hence a prototypical
growth regression can be speciﬁed as
yi,t+k,k = −λQi,t + γ
0Xit + ￿i,t+k,k, (2)
where Xit are the variables controlling for diﬀerent levels of long-run per capita GDP across
countries. Our main addition to the literature is to examine the eﬀect of adding an equity
market liberalization variable, Libi,t, to the growth regression:
yi,t+k,t = βQi,1980 + γ
0Xi,t + αLibi,t + ￿i,t+k,k (3)
where Qi,1980 represents the logarithm of per capita real GDP in 1980 and serves as an initial
GDP proxy. Because it is critical to capture the temporal dimension of the liberalization
process, we combine time-series with cross-sectional information.
5We identify the parameters using a GMM estimator described and analyzed in Bekaert,
Harvey and Lundblad (2001). The estimator maximizes the time-series content in our re-
gression by making use of overlapping data. We adjust the standard errors for the resulting
moving average component in the residuals using a cross-sectional extension to Hansen and
Hodrick (1980). Note that our regressors are all pre-determined. This estimator looks like an
instrumental variable estimator but it reduces to pooled OLS under simplifying assumptions
on the weighting matrix.
Our econometric framework raises four issues: the construction of the weighting ma-
trix, the choice of k, the speciﬁcation of the control variables and the construction of the
liberalization indicator.
First, growth regressions have been criticized for being contaminated by multicollinearity
[see Mankiw (1995)]. In a pure cross-sectional regression, the regressors may be highly cor-
related (highly developed countries score well on all proxies for long-run growth), the data
may be measured with error, and every country’s observation is implicitly viewed as an in-
dependent draw. It is therefore likely that standard errors underestimate the true sampling
error. In our panel methods, we can accommodate heteroskedasticity both across coun-
tries and across time and correlation between country residuals by choosing the appropriate
weighting matrix. In the tables, we report results using the method that accommodates
overlapping observations, and groupwise heteroskedasticity but does not allow for temporal
heteroskedasticity nor SUR eﬀects. Results available from the authors demonstrate that the
main results remain largely robust to accommodating these other eﬀects.
Second, since our sample is relatively short, starting only in 1980 and many liberalizations
only occurred in the 1990s we use k = 5, instead of k = 10 which is typical in the literature.
However, Islam (1995) and Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) ﬁnd very similar results using
k = 5 versus k = 10 and we check the robustness to the alternative k’s and the introduction
of variables controlling for the world business cycle.
Third, Levine and Renelt (1992) ﬁnd that most of the independent variables in standard
growth regressions are in a particular sense “fragile.” We are primarily interested in the
robustness of any eﬀect the liberalization dummy may have on growth. We minimize the
6data mining biases for the other regressors by closely mimicking the regression in Barro
(1997b). In addition, given the documented fragility of some of these variables, our initial
analysis adds the control variables one by one to the growth regression.
Fourth, perhaps the main methodological issue regarding our sample is the construction
of the equity market liberalization indicator variable. Although timing capital market re-
forms is prone to errors, the use of annual data reduces the impact of small timing errors.
Nevertheless, we conduct several robustness experiments with respect to the deﬁnition of the
liberalization variable.
3 Liberalization and Economic Growth
3.1 The liberalization eﬀect in a classic growth regression
Table 3 describes the results of a standard growth regression for our largest sample which
includes a constant, initial GDP (1980), government consumption to GDP, secondary school
enrollment, population growth, and life expectancy as explanatory variables. We present
results for k = 5, and add the variables one by one and eventually all together. When initial
GDP is the only regressor, it comes in with a strongly signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient. When
paired with the other control variables, which can now proxy for the steady state level of
GDP, it mostly comes in with a negative sign, as expected given the standard results on
conditional convergence. The control variables have the expected sign and all are strongly
signiﬁcant.
The results for the full regression are broadly consistent with the previous literature
(see Barro (1997a,b) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). Initial GDP enters with a very
signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient suggesting that low initial GDP levels imply higher growth
rates - conditional on the other variables. The secondary school enrollment and government
size variables become insigniﬁcant but have the correct sign. Life expectancy has a signiﬁcant
positive coeﬃcient suggesting that long life expectancy is associated with higher economic
growth. Population growth has a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient in the regression.
Most importantly, the liberalization coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant in all the re-
7gressions and four to six standard errors from zero. For example, in the full regression, the
liberalization coeﬃcient is 0.0097 and ﬁve standard errors from zero. This suggests that, on
average, a liberalization is associated with a 0.97% increase in the real per capita growth
rate in GDP. The eﬀect ranges from 0.92% to 1.29%. We also estimated the regression using
three non-overlapping ﬁve-year intervals. There are three diﬀerent samples with three time-
series observations without overlap; we run three regressions separately, and then average
the resulting coeﬃcients. The average growth eﬀect for the non-overlapping estimation is
1.03%.
Mankiw (1995) argues that omitted variable bias is a fundamental problem aﬀecting
almost all cross-country empirical work on growth. In our context, countries that adopt
policies that tend to enhance growth are likely to have good fundamentals along many
dimensions (for example, regarding human capital and health care). Because it is impossible
to control for all aspects of these policies, allowing an equity market liberalization variable
simply captures part or most of this omitted variable eﬀect. Therefore, we also consider a
ﬁxed eﬀects regression reported in Table 3, where we introduce a country-speciﬁc dummy.
The liberalization eﬀect decreases to 0.56% but it remains highly statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Interestingly, for the other samples we investigate, the ﬁxed eﬀect
estimation leads to a smaller change in the liberalization coeﬃcient. For example, in sample
IV the coeﬃcient shrinks from 1.08% to 1.03%.
3.2 Robustness
3.2.1 Alternative measures of liberalization
We consider two measurement issues regarding our liberalization variable: an alternative
timing and its relation to capital account openness. Because the coeﬃcients on the con-
trol variables are robust across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, we only present the alternative
liberalization eﬀects in Table 4. We now also report results for four diﬀerent sub-samples,
which represent a robustness exercise in its own right. The oﬃcial liberalization eﬀect, as
shown in panel A, is somewhat smaller for samples II and III, but it exceeds 1% for the more
homogeneous sample IV. As an interesting aside, we ﬁnd stronger evidence of conditional
8convergence the more homogeneous the sample is, which is consistent with the neo-classical
growth model [see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)]. Table 4, panel A, also suggests that the
coeﬃcient on the liberalization indicator is robust to using the First Sign dates.
The second part of Table 4, panel A, explores the role of capital account liberalization
which is the topic of a large debate. Rodrik (1998), Edison et al. (2002) claim that there
is no correlation between capital account liberalization and growth prospects. In contrast,
Edwards (2001) ﬁnds a positive eﬀect that is driven by the high income countries in his
sample. Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2003) conduct robustness experiments using
diﬀerent measures of openness and conclude that the relation between growth and capital
account liberalization is fragile.
Our measure of capital account openness (see also Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995))
is from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER). This publication reports several categories of information, mostly on current
account restrictions. The dummy variable takes on a value of zero if the country has at least
one restriction in the “restrictions on payments for the capital account transactions” cate-
gory.1 We ﬁrst look at the capital account liberalization separately. Consistent with Arteta,
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2003), we ﬁnd that the capital account liberalization relation
with growth is somewhat fragile. The coeﬃcient on this indicator is small and insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in samples I and II. The coeﬃcient is larger in samples III and IV but only
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in sample III. Consistent with Edwards (2001), the capital
account measure does best in our smaller samples which are more heavily weighted towards
high income countries.
Importantly, the equity market liberalization variable is robust to the inclusion of the
capital account liberalization variable. In the largest sample, the equity market liberaliza-
tion eﬀect is 0.94% per year over a ﬁve year period and it is smallest, 0.71% per year, in
sample III. The t-statistic ranges from 2.1 (sample IV) to 4.6 (sample I). The capital accoun-
1The IMF changed the reporting procedures in 1996 and included subcategories for capital account
restrictions (see the discussion in Miniane (2000)), but we follow the bulk of the literature in using the 0/1
variable.
9t liberalization dummy has no longer any signiﬁcant eﬀect on growth in samples I, II and
IV. While the coeﬃcient on the capital account liberalization indictor remains signiﬁcant in
sample III, the coeﬃcient is diminished when the equity market liberalization variable is in
the regression. The growth eﬀect of equity market liberalizations dominates that of capital
account openness.
In a comprehensive survey of the literature on capital account liberalization, Eichengreen
(2002) laments the lack of robust empirical results and calls for research to distinguish
diﬀerent types of controls. After all, the IMF measure is an aggregate measure of many
diﬀerent types of capital restrictions (including, for example, foreign exchange restrictions)
and any type of restriction leads to a “restricted” label. Miniane (2000) proposes averaging
the 13 subcategories in the AREAER as a measure of capital control intensity to get a
broader measure of restrictions. Quinn (1997) scores the intensity of the enforcement of
the controls. Quinn’s results are more in favor of a growth eﬀect, but the results in Quinn,
Inclan and Toyoda (2001) and Edwards (2001) suggests that some economic development is
necessary to reap the beneﬁts of capital account liberalization. Of course, by only focusing
on equity ﬂows, we respond to Eichengreen’s appeal and ﬁnd strong, robust results.
3.2.2 Other robustness checks
We conduct seven additional robustness checks. First, we compare Latin-American liberal-
izations to non-Latin American liberalizations. The results in panel B of Table 4 suggest
that this region is not driving the growth eﬀect. Second, we control for variation in the world
business cycle and interest rates. Panel C of Table 4 shows that OECD economic growth
exerts a strong positive inﬂuence in our growth regression but the liberalization eﬀect is not
diminished by the inclusion of the business cycle variables. Indeed, in each of our samples,
the growth eﬀect from liberalization increases once we add these variables. Third, we includ-
ed time-dummy variables in the main regression. These variables had no discernable impact
on the liberalization coeﬃcients. Fourth, we estimated the regressions with three alterna-
tive growth horizons: three, seven and ten years. While the liberalization eﬀect is present
at all horizons, this analysis suggests that most of the impact occurs in the ﬁrst ﬁve years
10after liberalization which is consistent with the convergence literature.2 Fifth, we tested
the sensitivity of our results to setting initial GDP at 1980 levels. As alternatives, we reset
GDP to 1990 levels and also considered using the initial GDP at the time when a country
liberalizes. Again, the inference did not change. Sixth, we altered our assumptions about
the weighting matrix. In particular, we considered an estimation with restricted SUR eﬀects
and an estimation that imposed homoskedasticity with no SUR eﬀects. The liberalization
result is resilient to such changes.
Finally, we conducted a Monte Carlo analysis of the liberalization eﬀect. For each repli-
cation, we draw 95 uniform random numbers and randomly assign one of the existing liber-
alization dummies to each country. We re-run the growth regression with the same control
variables but with purely random liberalization events. We repeat this experiment 1000
times. The 97.5th percentile of the distribution shows a coeﬃcient of 0.0057 and a t-statistic
of 3.25 as reported in the appendix. This is well below our estimated coeﬃcient of 0.0097 and
t-statistic of 7.00 reported in Table 3. Hence, the empirical p-value is less than 0.001. The
Monte Carlo evidence shows that the impact of the liberalization indicator is not a statisti-
cal artifact and not simply associated with the clustering of liberalizations in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. It also shows that a standard t-test may slightly over-reject at asymptotic
critical values, which we will take into account in our inference.
4 Endogeneity
As with the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on growth, endogeneity issues loom large. Is the
liberalization decision an exogenous political decision, or do countries liberalize when they
expect improved growth opportunities? These concerns are highly relevant for countries that
joined a free market area like Spain and Portugal in the European Union, where membership
simultaneously requires relaxing capital controls and favorable growth conditions. However,
such liberalizations are rare in our sample.
Nevertheless, we formally tackle the endogeneity issues using a two-pronged approach.
2The seven-year horizon regressions suggest that 88% of the growth impact of a liberalization takes place
in the ﬁrst ﬁve years.
11First, we try to directly control for growth opportunities. Second, we try to ﬁnd suitable
instruments for the liberalization decision by examining its determinants in a probit anal-
ysis. Absent a direct measure of growth opportunities, a proper instrument should explain
liberalizations but should not explain growth. We end the section reﬂecting on some other
subtle endogeneity concerns related to ﬁnancial development.
4.1 Growth Opportunities
If we could directly control for growth opportunities, the endogeneity concerns would be
greatly mitigated. However, this is a formidable task. Any local variable that is correlated
with growth opportunities may indicate an increase in growth opportunities because of the
planned equity liberalization. Hence, including the growth opportunity variable into the
regression is not very informative. Our approach is to look for “exogenous” growth oppor-
tunities. More speciﬁcally, we view each country as composed of a set of industries with
time-varying growth opportunities and assume that these growth prospects are reﬂected in
the price to earnings ratios of global industry portfolios. We then create an implied measure
of country-speciﬁc growth opportunities that reﬂects the growth prospects for each industry
(at the global level) weighted by the industrial composition for each country. We construct
an annual measure of the 3-digit SIC industry composition for each country by their output
shares according to the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database. For each SIC code, we also
measure price-earnings (PE) ratios for that industry at the global level, from which we con-
struct an implied measure of growth opportunities for each country by weighting each global
industry PE ratio by its relative share for that country. We divide this measure by the
overall world market PE ratio to remove the world discount rate eﬀect and we also measure




















12where IPEt is a vector of global industry price-earning ratios,3 wi,t is a vector of country-
speciﬁc industry weights, and WDPE t is the price-earning ratio of the world market.4
When we introduce this variable into a growth regression, panel A of Table 5 shows
that it predicts growth but does not drive out the liberalization eﬀect. The fact that the
GO measure is signiﬁcant in the regressions indicates that it is indeed a good measure of
growth opportunities. Comparing the growth eﬀect of liberalization in this regression with
the original eﬀect (repeated in panel D), we see that it is essentially unchanged.
4.2 Understanding the liberalization decision
The most probable reason why growth opportunities do not drive out the liberalization eﬀect
is because liberalizations are not driven by growth opportunities but by other factors. We
can verify this directly using a probit analysis of the liberalization decision. To measure
growth opportunities, we use the GO measure and GDP growth averaged over ﬁve years
preceding the liberalization date as independent variables. Another potential determinant
of liberalization is the level of economic development, which we proxy by the same control
variables as the ones used in the basic growth regression. It is also conceivable that ﬁnancial
liberalization is the natural outgrowth of a ﬁnancial development process, and consequently
we include a banking development measure (private credit to GDP) as an independent vari-
able. Finally, it is likely that political factors, such as political stability, the existence of a
democratic government, etc., play an important role in the liberalization process [see Perotti
and van Oijen (2001), Quinn, Inclan and Toyoda (2001) and Quinn (2001)].5 If this is true
and the level of political maturity is uncorrelated with growth opportunities, a measure of
political maturity might serve as an instrument for liberalization. As a start, we use ICRGs
political risk rating to proxy for the level of political maturity.
In Table 5, panel B, we present evidence for the probit estimation where the left hand
side is a 0/1 variable for which countries that liberalize receive a 1 and segmented countries
receive a 0. We exclude the fully liberalized countries - this helps us predict the probability
3All price-earnings ratios are taken from Datastream. We use the December value for our annual measures.
4The Datastream world market is the value weighted sum of the global industry portfolios.
5We thank Luc Laeven for suggesting this train of thought.
13of the liberalization decision. We have 68 countries that either liberalize after 1980 or do
not liberalize at all. For countries that liberalize, the right-hand-side predictive variables
are averaged over the 5-years preceding liberalization; for those countries that do not lib-
eralize, the right-hand-side predictive variables are averaged over the 5-years preceding the
liberalization date of their closest geographic neighbor.
Of the standard growth control variables, initial GDP comes in with a surprising nega-
tive sign and human capital with a strongly signiﬁcant positive sign. Some of the various
control variables proxying for economic development are highly correlated with one another.
For example, the correlation between life expectancy and secondary school enrollment is
0.76. Past GDP growth is not associated with the liberalization decision whereas growth
opportunities are negatively correlated with liberalization. The ﬁnancial development vari-
able comes in borderline signiﬁcantly but the political risk rating is strongly signiﬁcant.6
Apart from human capital, political risk is the strongest predictor of liberalization. Whereas
this measure does not directly reﬂect the current economic fundamentals, the work of Barro
(1997b), among others, has demonstrated negative growth eﬀects of political unrest. This
undermines the use of the broad political risk rating as an instrument for liberalization.
To further examine this issue, we collected time-series information on the 12 sub-components
of the ICRG Political Index. We construct four subindices: POL1 (Political) which includes
(a) Military in Politics and (b) Democratic Accountability; POL2 (Quality of Institution-
s) which includes (a) Corruption, (b) Law and Order and (c) Bureaucratic quality; POL3
(Socioeconomic Environment) which includes (a) Government Stability, (b) Socioeconom-
ic Conditions and (c) Investment Proﬁle; and POL4 (Conﬂict) which includes (a) Internal
Conﬂict, (b) External Conﬂict, (c) Religious Tensions and (d) Ethnic Tensions. These four
groups roughly maximize the within group cross-sectional correlation between the variables
and minimize the outside the group correlation.
We then repeated the probit analysis replacing the political risk rating by one of its com-
ponents. As the results in Panel B reveal, the POL2 – variables, associated with the quality
6We also performed the analysis using changes in the independent variables as regressors but found no
signiﬁcant predictors of liberalizations.
14of institutions, are by far the most important determinant of the liberalization decision,
driving the overall variable’s signiﬁcance.
Using probit analysis, we ﬁnd that, among those countries that either elect to liberalize in
our sample or not (excluding the fully liberalized set), a higher level of institutional quality is
associated with an increased probability of an equity market liberalization. To evaluate the
ability of this variable to serve as an adequate instrument for liberalization in our growth
regressions, we next consider the relationship between the “Quality of Institutions” and
future GDP growth. To be clear, the “Quality of Institutions” variable may be associated
with growth for the broader set of integrated countries because of the positive association
between liberalization and future growth. Hence, for this particular instrument, we are
interested in the growth eﬀect for segmented countries only.
In Table 5, panel C, we conduct standard growth regressions to explore the growth
eﬀect of these political rating subgroups only for the 27 segmented countries in our sample.
We enter the four political subgroup indices and the overall ICRG political risk measure
separately as independent variables in a growth regression either with ﬁxed eﬀects without
additional controls or a constant with all the usual growth controls employed in Table 3.
We ﬁnd that, stripped of the liberalization channel, the “Quality of Institutions” variable
has no signiﬁcant association with future growth. In contrast, the Conﬂict subgroup is
a signiﬁcant predictor of growth for these countries and subsumes all of the political risk
rating’s predictive power for growth. It is likely that this variable is highly correlated with
the political unrest variable used in Barro’s (1997b) growth regression.
4.3 Instrumental Variables Estimation
Finally, in panel D, we report estimates from a standard growth regression for samples II, III,
and IV for which the ICRG political risk variables are available. We include in the regressions,
but do not report, the same control variables as presented in Table 3. In this estimation,
however, we employ an instrumental variables approach within our GMM framework, where
we use all the regressors as their own instruments, but instrument the liberalization indicator
with the “Quality of Institutions” variable. Interestingly, the estimated liberalization eﬀect
15remains positive and highly signiﬁcant. The magnitude of the eﬀect decreases in sample II
to 57 basis points, and increases in samples III and IV. Including the overall ICRG Political
Risk measure or the Conﬂict subgroup, which we know are associated with growth for the
segmented countries, as separate controls, does not alter the signiﬁcance of the liberalization
eﬀect. We conclude that our results are not likely due to the endogeneity of the liberalization
decision.
4.4 Endogeneity and ﬁnancial development
Our test design deﬁnitely suﬀers less from endogeneity concerns than earlier tests of the
links between general ﬁnancial development and growth. However, our tests do suﬀer from
a subtle endogeneity bias related to ﬁnancial development: a country cannot liberalize its
ﬁnancial markets when it does not have ﬁnancial markets. Later we will control for ﬁnancial
development directly, but for these exercises we select countries for which we have data
on ﬁnancial markets and therefore are already somewhat ﬁnancially developed. Hence, by
comparing samples I and II with samples III and especially IV, we basically exclude countries
without ﬁnancial markets and part of the eﬀect that we measure for samples I and II may be
a ﬁnancial under-development phenomenon. Since the liberalization eﬀect is in fact largest
for sample IV (see Table 4), this problem does not appear to bias our results towards ﬁnding
large liberalization eﬀects for our largest samples.
Clayton, Jorgensen and Kavajecz (2000) test the ﬁnancial underdevelopment hypothesis
directly by examining the impact of the existence of ﬁnancial exchanges on 16 macroeco-
nomic and ﬁnancial variables. They ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant association between the
existence of a ﬁnancial exchange and increased GDP growth prospects.
5 Accounting for the Liberalization Eﬀect
Our growth eﬀect is surprisingly large. One potential interpretation is that reforms are
multi-faceted. Countries may liberalize equity markets at the same time as they remove
restrictions on foreign exchange, deregulate the banking system, and undertake steps to
16develop the equity market. In this section, we introduce proxies for other contemporaneous
reforms into the main regressions.
We investigate three types of reforms: macro-reforms, ﬁnancial reforms and legal reforms.
We do not have suﬃcient information to determine the exact time lines of reforms for all
our countries in most instances. Consequently, we follow an indirect approach by inserting
as control variables into our growth regression continuous variables that measure the direct
eﬀect of the reforms. An example would be the level of inﬂation for macro-reforms. The
third bloc of variables examined in Table 2 comprises the variables used in this section.
Table 2 shows that indeed in most instances these variables change in the required direction
after an equity liberalization, and that liberalized economies score better on measures of
macro-economic stability, ﬁnancial development and rule of law. This is an indication of
the potential simultaneity of reforms directly aﬀecting these variables on the one hand and
equity market liberalization on the other hand or it may be that equity market liberalization
contributes to a better macro-economic environment, promotes ﬁnancial development or in-
stigates legal reforms that improve the legal environment. In fact, Rajan and Zingales (2003)
point out that ﬁnancial development may be blocked by groups (incumbents) interested in
maintaining their monopoly position (in goods and capital markets). They argue that this
is less likely to be the case if the country has open trade and free capital ﬂows and hence
ﬁnancial openness may instigate other reforms.
In any case, the introduction of these continuous variables into our regression is likely
to drive out the liberalization eﬀect, which is a very coarse measurement of the extent and
quality of the reforms. We do have detailed time line information on one type of reform: the
introduction of insider trading rules and their implementation and we examine its growth
eﬀects and how it aﬀects the growth eﬀect of liberalization directly. Finally, we conjecture
that a big reform package is likely after a major ﬁnancial crisis, such as a banking crisis,
and use information on the timing of banking crises to create another control for reform
simultaneity eﬀects.
175.1 Macroeconomic reforms
Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1992) and Henry (2000) discuss how policy reforms, includ-
ing equity market liberalization, in developing countries typically involve domestic macro-
reforms. We consider four variables that proxy for macroeconomic reforms and add them
to the regression: trade openness, the level of inﬂation, the black market foreign exchange
premium, and the government deﬁcit.
Our measure of trade openness is the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. The eﬀect of
trade integration and trade liberalization on growth is the subject of a large literature. Dollar
(1992), Lee (1993), Edwards (1998), Sachs and Warner (1995) and more recently Wacziarg
(2001) have established that lower barriers to trade induce higher growth. Rodriguez and
Rodrik (2001) have recently criticized these studies on many grounds. However, Rodriguez
and Rodrik primarily question whether trade policy rather than trade volume has aﬀected
growth. In our study, we are interested in the eﬀect of ﬁnancial market liberalization not in
testing the impact of trade policy. The results in Table 6, panel B, show that, in all samples,
the coeﬃcient on trade openness is highly signiﬁcant and positive suggesting countries that
are open have higher growth than countries that are relatively closed.
Barro (1997a,b) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant negative relation between inﬂation and economic
growth and ﬁnds that the result is primarily due to a strong negative relation between
very high inﬂation rates (over 15%) and economic growth. We use the natural logarithm
of one plus the inﬂation rate to diminish the impact of some outlier observations.Indeed,
given that the extreme skewness in inﬂation is primarily due to inﬂation in Latin-American
countries, we also introduce a dummy for Latin America.
The results in Table 6 for the inﬂation variable are mixed. We ﬁnd that seven of the eight
coeﬃcients on inﬂation are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Inﬂation is never signiﬁcant
for the Latin American countries. In three of the four non-Latin American samples, the
sign is positive and even signiﬁcant for sample I. In sample IV, inﬂation has a large but
insigniﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient for non-Latin American countries.7
7We also estimated a regression without the Latin American indicator. The coeﬃcient on the single
inﬂation variable was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We also considered a regression with dummies
18We also examine the eﬀect of introducing black market foreign exchange premiums. The
black market premium is taken from Easterly (2001). This variable measures the premium
market participants must pay, relative to the oﬃcial exchange rate, to exchange the domestic
currency for dollars in the parallel market. The black market premium is often used as
an indicator of macroeconomic imbalances and would consequently be sensitive to macro-
reforms. It is also a direct indicator of the existence of foreign exchange restrictions and
it should therefore not be surprising that it is closely correlated with market integration
and equity market liberalization (see for instance Bekaert (1995)). Hence the black market
premium may also be an inverse indicator of the quality and comprehensiveness of the equity
market liberalization. Table 2 shows that the black market premium substantially decreases
from a preliberalization level of 0.150 to a post-liberalization premium of 0.072.
As with the inﬂation indicator, we report results (both in Tables 2 and 6) based on the
natural logarithm of one plus the black market premium to dampen the inﬂuence of outliers.
The results in Table 6 show that the premium has a strong negative relation to economic
growth in our three largest samples. It is insigniﬁcant for our smallest sample.
Our ﬁnal indicator of macro-reforms is the size of a country’s ﬁscal deﬁcit. IMF adjust-
ment programs often impose budgetary austerity and the sequencing literature on capital
market reforms (see, for instance, Edwards (1987)) argues that ﬁnancial openness can only
be beneﬁcial when countries ﬁrst have government ﬁnances under control. Hence, the ﬁscal
deﬁcit variable potentially can both capture policy reform simultaneity and diﬀerentiate be-
tween successful and not successful liberalizations. For the purposes of our regressions, we
deﬁne the deﬁcit as the total expenditure less revenue for the central government. The results
for the deﬁcit indicator are only available for the smallest sample. However, Table 6 shows
that the deﬁcit variable is strongly signiﬁcant and negatively inﬂuences growth prospects.
The ﬁnal line of Table 6, panel B, shows the impact on the liberalization variable of
including these four macroeconomic variables. In all of the samples, the size of the liber-
alization coeﬃcient decreases by about 25 basis points – but remains signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
for Brazil and Argentina only, the largest outliers in inﬂation data. Here, we ﬁnd negative but insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients, whereas the eﬀect for Argentina and Brazil is negative and signiﬁcant.
19from zero. For example, in sample I, the coeﬃcient is reduced from 0.97% (Table 3 and
repeated in Table 6, panel A) to 0.74%. Hence, our results indicate that part of the equity
market liberalization eﬀect is accounted for by these four diﬀerent proxies for macro-reforms.
5.2 Financial reforms
Regulatory changes furthering ﬁnancial development may have occured simultaneously with
the equity market liberalization. There is a signiﬁcant literature that studies the relation
between ﬁnancial development and growth with contributions as early as McKinnon (1973)
and Patrick (1966). Interestingly, Rousseau and Sylla (1999, 2003) show that early U.S.
growth in the 1815-1840 period and early growth in other countries was ﬁnance led. We
examine two ﬁnancial development indicators: the size of the banking sector and stock
exchange trading activity.
King and Levine (1993) study the impact of banking sector development on growth
prospects.8 Kaminisky and Schmukler (2002) study the timing and impact of equity market,
capital account, and banking reforms. Panel C of Table 6 examines the role of the banking
sector by adding private credit to GDP to the growth regression. Private credit to GDP
enters signiﬁcantly in all samples.
Atje and Jovanovic (1989), Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (1996), Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Mak-
simovic (1996) and Levine and Zervos (1996, 1998a) examine the eﬀect of stock market
development on economic growth. In panel C, we also add, as an additional independent
variable, equity turnover (a measure of trading activity).9 This ﬁnancial variable is only
available for the two smaller sets of countries: 50 and 28 countries. The results in panel C of
Table 6 show that the coeﬃcient on the turnover variable is positive and signiﬁcant for both
8Jayarathne and Strahan (1996) ﬁnd that banking deregulation led to higher regional economic growth
within the U.S. whereas Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) measure the
growth eﬀect of the “exogenous component” of banking development.
9We do not consider market capitalization to GDP, since this variable is hard to interpret. Having a
measure of overall equity values in the numerator, it may simply be a forward looking indicator of future
growth or it may be related to the cost of capital. In addition, Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) ﬁnd market
capitalization to GDP to have a weaker impact than value traded in their cross-country analysis of growth.
20samples. This implies a positive relation between stock market development and economic
growth, consistent with previous studies.
In all four samples, the liberalization eﬀect is somewhat diminished, dropping between 17
and 20 basis points across the samples. However, the liberalization coeﬃcient continues to
be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Clearly, liberalization is more than just another aspect
of more general ﬁnancial development, not deserving of special attention.
5.3 Legal environment
In a series of inﬂuential papers, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) and Djankov et
al. (2003) stress the cross-country diﬀerences in the legal environment (either laws or their
enforcement) in general and the legal environment regarding investor protection in particular.
Reforms improving investor protection may promote ﬁnancial development (see La Porta et
al. (1997) for a direct test) and hence growth. The recent literature on ﬁnancing constraints
suggests a concrete channel through which this may occur. If capital markets are imperfect,
external capital is likely to be more costly than internal capital and a shortage of internal
capital will reduce investment below ﬁrst-best levels. Recent empirical work shows that
ﬁnancial development (see Rajan and Zingales (1998), Love (2003)) and the liberalization of
the banking sector (Laeven (2000)) may help relax these ﬁnancing constraints and increase
investment. Financial liberalization will make available more foreign capital but this does
not necessarily resolve the market imperfections that lead to a wedge between the internal
and external ﬁnance cost of capital. Reforms improving corporate governance and reducing
the ability of insiders to extract resources from the ﬁrm may directly aﬀect the external
cost of capital. More generally, a better legal environment may increase steady state GDP.
Whereas it is possible that the presence of foreign investors promotes ﬁnancial reforms that
help reduce ﬁnancing constraints and the external ﬁnance cost of capital premium, it is
conceivable that reforms improving the legal environment and investor protection are the
real source of the improved growth prospects.
To examine this issue, we follow La Porta et al. (1997) and use a variable that measures
the rule of law in general which is the Rule of Law subcomponent of the ICRG political risk
21rating. Table 2 indicates that this variable signiﬁcantly increases post-liberalization. When
we add this measure to the growth regression (see Panel D), the growth eﬀect of equity
market liberalization slightly increases for sample II, but decreases for samples III and IV
by about 20 basis points. In these last two samples, Law and Order generates small but
signiﬁcant growth eﬀects.
Second, we use the insider trading law dummies created by Bhattacharya and Daouk
(2002). They argue that the enforcement of insider trading laws makes developing markets
more attractive to international investors. They present evidence that associates insider trad-
ing laws with a lower cost of capital in a sample of 95 countries. Importantly, Bhattacharya
and Daouk distinguish between the enactment of insider trading laws and the enforcement
of these laws.
Insider trading laws, and especially their enforcement, may be quite closely related to the
corporate governance problems that lead to the external ﬁnance premium. Enforcement of
insider trading laws may be a good instrument for reduced external ﬁnancing constraints. It
is possible that the enactment of such rules are particularly valued and perhaps demanded
by foreigners before they risk investing in emerging markets. Indeed, the enforcement of
insider trading laws may proxy for a more general state of law enforcement that may be
correlated with policy reforms introducing equity market liberalization.
Panel D of Table 6 examines the relation between the enactment and enforcement of
insider trading laws and economic growth. The existence of these laws has no signiﬁcant
relation to economic growth, as evidenced in the ﬁrst set of results. While the coeﬃcients on
insider trading prosecutions are also not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, they are consistently
positive across the four samples ranging between 0.22% (sample IV) and 0.33% (sample III).
However, the equity market liberalization remains signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the
presence of the insider trading variable and drops by at most 11 basis points.10
10Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) examine the diﬀerential impact of insider trading laws and ﬁnancial
liberalizations on the cost of capital. While they ﬁnd that both factors are important, the liberalization
eﬀect is more prominent.
225.4 Banking crises
It is conceivable that a major crisis of an economic nature induces a plethora of reforms, one
of which being an equity market liberalization.11 If this is the case, a crisis indicator could
be a very useful control for the policy simultaneity problem. Caprio and Klingebiel (2001)
provide the necessary information to create such an indicator; they survey and date banking
crises for about 90 countries, diﬀerentiating between systemic and non-systemic banking
crises. A banking crisis can bias our regressions in two distinct ways.
First, if policy reforms are clustered right after a crisis, the presence of a crisis negatively
aﬀects growth just before the reforms take place biasing the growth eﬀect upward. We use
a contemporaneous banking crisis dummy to control for this eﬀect. Panel E of Table 6
shows that in all samples and across both deﬁnitions, growth is signiﬁcantly lower during
crisis times. However, the introduction of the crisis dummy does not aﬀect the magnitude of
the equity market liberalization eﬀect, even though it is somewhat decreased in magnitude,
especially in sample IV.
Second, we control for policy simultaneity by adding a dummy variable for the post-crisis
period. The variable takes the value of one in the last year of the crisis and each year
afterward. In most samples, there is signiﬁcantly higher economic growth in the post crisis
period (either systemic or systemic/borderline). This is particularly true for the broader
deﬁnition of crisis. The liberalization eﬀect, however, is largely unaﬀected by the inclusion
of the post-banking crisis variable.
Intuition would suggest that some of the increment to economic growth resulting from
an equity market liberalization may be attributed to simultaneous policy reforms. While the
incremental growth resulting from a liberalization is smaller in the presence of proxies for
reforms, they do not completely subsume the equity market liberalization eﬀect.
11For example, Drazen and Easterly (2001) ﬁnd that reforms are more likely to occur when inﬂation and
black market premiums are at extreme values. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) examine the interrelation
between banking and currency crises and ﬁnancial liberalizations.
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It is unlikely that equity market liberalization, or the more general reforms it may proxy for,
has the same impact in every country. The growth eﬀect should depend on two factors: how
much additional investment do the reforms generate (e.g. because the cost of capital goes
down) and the eﬃciency of new investments. It is likely that countries with a relatively high
physical and human capital stock, relatively eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets, good legal institutions
etc. might see highly eﬃcient investment and a large growth response. But one could also
make the case that countries with relatively bad institutions, an ineﬃcient legal system,
serious corporate governance problems, may experience the largest drop in the cost of capital,
and generate larger investment increases. Overall, the signs of interaction eﬀects between
liberalization and domestic factors are ex ante unclear.
In this section, we provide an exploratory analysis of what diﬀerentiates the liberalization
eﬀects across countries. We begin by looking at a simple measure of the comprehensiveness
or intensity of the reforms. We then consider whether the magnitude of the eﬀect depends
on the level of ﬁnancial development. Finally, we follow La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999,
2000) and consider institutional factors that measure the quality of the legal environment
both overall and speciﬁcally for equity investors.
6.1 Intensity of liberalization
Liberalizations are often gradual and our dummy variable does not capture the intensity or
comprehensiveness of the liberalization. A country opening up only 10% of its equity market
to foreigners should expect a diﬀerent growth eﬀect than a country that allows 100%. Bekaert
(1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003) propose a measure of equity market openness based
on the ratio of the capitalization of the IFC investable to the global stocks in each country.12
A ratio of one means that all of the stocks are available to foreign investors. In Table 7, we
call this measure “Intensity A”. We also explore a related measure by calculating the ratio
12The IFC’s global stock index seeks to represent the local stock market whereas the investable index
corrects market capitalization for foreign ownership restrictions.
24of the number of ﬁrms in the investable and global indices for each country (“Intensity B”).
Given the high volatility of emerging market equity returns, this measure may be less noisy.
Table 1 has more details on the construction of these variables. The estimates reported in
panel A of Table 7 can be interpreted as the liberalization eﬀect for countries which are fully
open. The eﬀect is, not surprisingly, stronger than the “coarse” liberalization eﬀect. For
Intensity Measure B, the growth eﬀect of a full equity market liberalization is at least 1.2%
and it is 1.7% in sample IV. For Intensity Measure A, the eﬀects are slightly larger in samples
I and II and much larger in samples III and IV. In all samples and for both measures, the
coeﬃcients are strongly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
6.2 Financial development
We explore the diﬀerences across countries in the equity market liberalization eﬀect by
breaking up the indicator variable into three pieces:
yi,t+k,t = βQi,1980+γ
0Xi,t+αLibFulli,t+αLLibLowi,t+αHLibHighi,t+δChari,t+￿i,t+k,k (5)
where LibFulli,t represents an indicator for countries that are fully liberalized throughout
our sample; LibLowi,t denotes the countries that liberalize but have a characteristic, such as
ﬁnancial development, that falls below the median of the liberalizing countries; and LibHighi,t
is the analogous deﬁnition for countries with a higher than median value of the characteristic.
Importantly, the regression also includes the own-eﬀect of the characteristic, which is denoted
by Chari,t. We report the coeﬃcients on the high and low characteristic indicators as well
as a Wald test of whether the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. We also report the
coeﬃcient on the own eﬀect.13
Table 2 suggests that ﬁnancial development indicators substantially improve post equity
market liberalizations. Panel B of Table 7 shows that countries that have a higher than
median private credit to GDP ratio experience signiﬁcantly higher growth after liberalization
13We also estimated, but do not report, a more complex speciﬁcation whereby the characteristics are
interacted with the liberalization variables. Given that the results are similar, we elected to report the more
intuitive analysis.
25(1.05% for higher than average private credit to GDP and 0.48% for low level of private credit
to GDP). The results suggest that a strong banking system provides the foundation whereby
a country can have a larger increment to growth following an equity market liberalization.
Panel B shows very similar results for our proxy for the development of equity markets:
turnover. If a country has less than average turnover, then the eﬀect of an equity market
liberalization is a modest 0.17%. Countries with more than median turnover experience an
average 0.94% boost in growth.
The ﬁnancial development results provide the following two insights. First, equity market
liberalization adds something over and above the impact of a change in a variable that proxies
for ﬁnancial development (Table 6). Second, the level of ﬁnancial development matters.
Liberalizations have a greater eﬀect on economic growth if the country starts with above
average ﬁnancial development (Table 7).
6.3 Legal and investment environment
We look at a number of variables that proxy for the legal environment. We start with the
classiﬁcation of legal systems based on their origins, in La Porta et al. (1997): English,
French and Other. La Porta et al. argue that the type of legal regime is a good proxy for the
degree of investor protection. We use a measure of judicial eﬃciency from La Porta et al.
(1998) which is based on Business International Corporation’s assessment of the “eﬃciency
and integrity of the legal environment as it aﬀects business, particular foreign ﬁrms.” We
also consider the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer’s (2003) measure of the
duration of the legal process, both for collection from bad checks and tenant eviction. They
argue that this measure is a good instrument for judicial formalism which is inversely related
to court quality. One disadvantage of these variables is that they are purely cross-sectional.
It is conceivable that liberalization and the presence of foreign investors might aﬀect the
legal system. Alternatively, foreign investors may be reluctant to invest in countries with
poorly developed legal systems. We ﬁnd some evidence in favor of the latter interpretation
in that all the interaction eﬀects are positive.
For example, according to the results in Table 7 the growth impact of a liberalization
26is signiﬁcantly greater for countries with English versus French legal origins (1.24% versus
0.68%). Although English legal origins is associated with higher growth than Other legal
origins, the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. There is higher growth eﬀect associated
with countries with a speedier judicial processes (0.84% for speedy and 0.29% for slow judicial
processes). However, this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (p-value is 0.14).
Finally, we examine the state of the investment environment. First, using the IRGG Eco-
nomic risk rating (which includes current level of GDP per capita, inﬂation, current account
and budget balances), we ﬁnd that the current state of the economy has an insigniﬁcant im-
pact on the heterogeneity of the growth eﬀect. Second, we investigate the Investment Proﬁle
subcategory in the ICRG political risk ratings (which includes Contract Viability, Proﬁt
Repatriation, and Payment Delays). We ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant diﬀerence when sorting
by this characteristic. Countries with better than average investment proﬁles experience a
0.85% increment in growth whereas a lower than average proﬁle shows only a 0.19% increase.
We also use, following La Porta et al. (1997), direct proxies for investor protection:
Anti-director Rights, Creditor Rights and Accounting Standards. Countries with better
director rights or creditor rights or accounting standards experience higher economic growth.
However, the eﬀect for creditor rights is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Some of these
eﬀects are quite striking. For example the growth increment for countries with higher than
average rated accounting standards is 1.1% whereas it is only 0.04% for countries with below
average accounting standards.
Table 7 also includes information on the own eﬀect of each characteristic. Both of the
ﬁnancial development indicators have a positive eﬀect in the regression which is not surprising
given the results in Table 6. The own eﬀect for the speed of the judicial process is not
signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance levels. The current state of the economy has a strongly
signiﬁcantly own eﬀect along with the Investment Proﬁle. Finally, all three of the investor
protection variables have positive own eﬀects, however, the accounting standards eﬀect is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Our analysis of heterogeneity of the growth eﬀect has a simple message. First, not
all countries experience the same increment to growth after equity market liberalizations.
27Second, the countries that beneﬁt the most in terms of growth are those with: higher than
average ﬁnancial development, English rather than French/Other legal origins, a favorable
investment proﬁle for foreign direct and portfolio investors, and higher than average investor
protection.
7 Conclusions
Although there has been substantial research on the relation between ﬁnancial development
and economic growth, both the ﬁnance and development literature lacks a comprehensive
analysis of the eﬀects of the equity market liberalization process on economic growth.
Our research demonstrates that equity market liberalization (allowing foreign investors
to transact in local securities and vice versa) did increase economic growth. We augment
the standard set of variables used in economic growth research with an indicator variable
for equity market liberalization. We ﬁnd that liberalization leads to an approximate one
percent increase in annual real per capita GDP growth over a ﬁve year period and ﬁnd this
increase to be statistically signiﬁcant. This result is robust to a wide variety of experiments
including: an alternative set of liberalization dates, diﬀerent groupings of countries, regional
indicator variables, business cycle eﬀects, diﬀerent weighting matrices for the calculation of
standard errors, four diﬀerent time-horizons for measuring economic growth and more.
The approximately one percent increment in real growth following an equity market lib-
eralization is surprisingly large. It is reasonable to expect that equity market liberalizations
are intertwined with both macroeconomic reforms and ﬁnancial development. Our evidence
to some degree supports this point of view. Importantly, after controlling for either macro
reforms, ﬁnancial development, banking crises, legal reforms and the ability of a country
to enforce its laws, we still ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant impact on economic growth from
equity market liberalizations.
Most of our speciﬁcations, by construction, force a common coeﬃcient relating liberal-
izations to growth in every country. It makes sense that there are country-speciﬁc deviations
from the average. It is of great interest to investigate what might make a country have
a greater (or lesser) response to a ﬁnancial liberalization. In his book on trade openness,
28Rodrik (1999) argues that openness may not be suitable for all countries. Likewise ﬁnancial
liberalization may not bring the anticipated beneﬁts depending on the strength of the do-
mestic institutions and other factors. Whereas in recent work, Edwards (2001) and Quinn,
Inclan and Toyoda (2001) suggest that the beneﬁts of capital account liberalization are re-
stricted to more developed countries, we do not ﬁnd the growth eﬀect to depend positively
on development levels. We ﬁnd that countries that are further along in terms of ﬁnancial
development experience a larger than average boost from equity market liberalization. In
addition, countries with better legal systems, favorable conditions for foreign investment and
investor protection, generate larger growth eﬀects.
Although our regressions are predictive, it is important to keep in mind that they re-
veal association not causality. While our analysis describes a number of plausible channels
through which the liberalization eﬀect may have occurred, the answer to the question ‘does’
rather than ‘did’ ﬁnancial liberalization aﬀect economic growth? remains diﬃcult to answer
deﬁnitively. Interestingly, our broad cross-country growth results appear consistent with
scattered micro-evidence and event studies. Levine and Zervos (1998b) ﬁnd that stock mar-
kets become more liquid following stock market liberalizations in a study of 16 countries.
Karolyi (1998) surveys a rich ADR literature, which shows that ADRs, which can be viewed
as investment liberalizations, lead to reduced costs of capital. Chari and Henry (2002) show
that individual ﬁrms experience reductions in the costs of capital post-equity market liber-
alization. Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2003) show that ﬁrms from emerging markets listing
in the U.S. are able to relax ﬁnancing constraints. Galindo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (2001)
show that ﬁnancial liberalization improves the eﬃciency of capital allocation for ﬁrms in
12 developing countries. Gupta and Yuan (2003) show that industries which depend more
on external ﬁnance experience signiﬁcantly higher growth following liberalization and grow
faster through the creation of new plants (rather than investing in existing ones).
Finally, we measure an average growth eﬀect. If true, the distribution of the welfare gain
is an important social issue. Das and Mohapatra (2003) show that the gains from increased
growth post-equity market liberalization are unequally distributed, accruing mostly to the
top quintile of the population.
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34Table 1
Description of the Variables
All data are employed at the annual frequency.
Variable Description
Dating equity market liberalization
Official equity market liberalization indicator Corresponding to a date of formal regulatory change after which foreign investors officially have the 
opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities. Official Liberalization dates, presented in Table 2, are 
based on Bekaert and Harvey (2002) A Chronology of Important Financial, Economic and Political 
Events in Emerging Markets,  http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/chronology.htm. This chronology is based on 
over 50 different source materials. A condensed version of the chronology, along with the selection of dates 
for a number of countries appears in Bekaert and Harvey (2000).  We have extended their official 
liberalization dates to include Japan, New Zealand, and Spain. For the liberalizing countries, the associated 
official liberalization indicator takes a value of one when the equity market is officially liberalized and 
thereafter, and zero otherwise.  For the remaining countries, fully segmented countries are assumed to have 
an indicator value of zero, and fully liberalized countries are assumed to have an indicator value of one. 
These dates appear in Appendix A.
  
First sign equity market liberalization indicator "First Sign" equity market liberalization dates denote the year associated with the earliest of three dates: 
official liberalizations, first American Depositary Receipt (ADR) announcement and first country fund 
launch.  The first sign indicator takes a value of one on and after the first sign year, and zero otherwise.  As 
with the official liberalization indicator, fully segmented countries are assumed to have an indicator value 
of zero, and fully liberalized countries are assumed to have an indicator value of one. These dates are 
reported in Appendix A.
Intensity equity market liberalization indicator Following Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003), the intensity measure is based on the ratio of 
the market capitalization of the constituent firms comprising the IFC Investable index to those that 
comprise the IFC Global index for each country.  The IFC Global index, subject to some exclusion 
restrictions, is designed to represent the overall market portfolio for each country, whereas the IFC 
Investable index is designed to represent a portfolio of domestic equities that are available to foreign 
investors.  A ratio of one means that all of the stocks are available to foreign investors.  We denote this 
measure: Intensity A .  We also explore a related measure, Intensity B,  by calculating the ratio of the 
number of firms in the investable and global indices for each country.  In both cases, fully segmented 
countries have an intensity measure of zero, and fully liberalized countries have an intensity measure of 
one.
Other important dates
Capital account liberalization indicator We measure capital account openness by employing the the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions  (AREAER).  This publication reports six categories of 
information.  The capital account liberalization indicator takes on value of zero if the country has at least 
one restriction in the particular category. The category that we focus on is the "restrictions on payments for 
the capital account transaction." These dates are reported in Appendix A.
Banking sector crisis indicator Caprio and Klingebiel (2001) document systemic and borderline banking sector crises.  We construct 
banking crisis indicators that take a value of one when a) a country is undergoing a systemic banking sector 
crisis or b) when a country is undergoing either a systemic or borderline banking sector crisis.  We also 
construct post-banking crisis indicators that take a value of one in the last year and each subsequent year 
following a) a systemic banking sector crisis or b) either a systemic or borderline banking sector crisis.
Insider trading law indicator Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) document the enactment of insider trading laws and the first prosecution of 
these laws.  We construct two indicator variables. The first takes the value of one following the 
introduction of an insider trading law. The second takes the value of one after the law's first prosecution.Table 1
(Continued)
Variable Description
Macroeconomic and demographic measures
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth Growth of real per capita gross domestic product. Available for all countries from 1980 through 1997. 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM.
Initial GDP Logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product in 1980.  Available for all countries. Source: World 
Bank Development Indicators  CD-ROM.
Government consumption/GDP Government consumption divided by gross domestic product.  General government final consumption 
expenditure includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including 
compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but 
excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation.  Available for all 
countries from 1980 through 1997. Source: World Bank Development Indicators  CD-ROM.
Secondary school enrollment Secondary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the 
age group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of education.  Accordingly, the reported value 
can exceed (or average) more than 100%.  Available for all countries from 1980 through 1997 to the 
secondary level of education.  Available for all countries from 1980 through 1997. Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators  CD-ROM. 
Population growth Growth rate of total population which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.  
Available for all countries from 1980 through 1997. Source: World Bank Development Indicators  CD-
ROM.
Log life expectancy Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of 
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.  Available for all countries from 
1980 through 1997. Source: World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM.
OECD GDP growth Growth of real per capita gross domestic product for high-income OECD members.  High-income 
economies are those in which 1998 GNP per capita was $9,361 or more.  Source:  World Bank 
Development Indicators  CD-ROM.
World real interest rate Constructed from each country's real interest rates. The GDP weighted real interest rate for the G-7 
countries, where the real rate for each country is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured 
by the GDP deflator.   Source: World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM.
Macroeconomic reforms
Trade/GDP The trade dependency ratio is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product. Available for all countries from 1980 through 1997. Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators  CD-ROM.
Inflation Inflation as measured by the log annual growth rate of the gross domestic product implicit deflator.  We use 
the CPI if the GDP-deflator is not available.  Available for all countries from 1980 through 1997. Source: 
World Bank Development Indicators  CD-ROM.
Black market premium The black market premium is defined as (parallel FXrate/official FXrate-1)*100, where parallel FXrate is 
the black market rate. The variable measures the premium market participants must pay, relative to the 
official exchange rate, to exchange the domestic currency for dollars in the black market.  Available for all 
countries from 1980 through 1997. Source: Easterly (2001).
Fiscal deficit The overall budget deficit is total expenditure and lending minus repayments less current and capital 
revenue and official grants received; shown as a percentage of GDP.  Data are available for central 
governments only.  Available for 28 countries from 1980 through 1997.  Source: World Bank Development 
Indicators  CD-ROM.Table 1
(Continued)
Variable Description
Variables used in endogeneity analysis
Growth Opportunities An implied measure of country-specific growth opportunities that reflects the growth prospects for each 
industry (at the global level) weighted by the industrial composition for each country. We construct an 
annual measure of the 3-digit SIC industry composition for each country by their output shares according to 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database. For each SIC code, we also measure price-earnings (PE) ratios for 
that industry at the global level, from which we construct an implied measure of growth opportunities for 
each country by weighting each global industry PE ratio by its relative share for that country. We subtract 
from this measure the overall world market PE ratio to remove the world discount rate effect (and we 
remove a 5-year moving average), and call the difference “growth opportunities” (GO).  Available for 92 
countries from 1980 through 1997.  Source: Bekaert et al. (2003).
Political risk rating The value of the the Political Risk Service (PRS) Group’s political risk indicator (which ranges between 0 
and 100).  The risk rating is a combination of 12 subcomponents (documented below). Overall, a political 
risk rating of 0.0% to 49.9% indicates a Very High Risk; 50.0% to 59.9% High Risk; 60.0% to 69.9% 
Moderate Risk; 70.0% to 79.9% Low Risk; and 80.0% or more Very Low Risk. The data are available for 
75 countries from 1984 through 1997.  For each country, we backfill the 1984 value to 1980. Source: 
Various issues of the International Country Risk Guide.  There are 12 subcomponents to this index. We 
create four sub-indices: POL1 (Political Conditions), POL2 (Quality of Institutions), POL3 (Socio-
economic conditions), and POL4 (Conflict).
POL1 (Political Conditions) The sum of ICRG subcomponents: Military in Politics and Democratic Accountability
     Military in Politics (POL1) ICRG political risk sub-component (6% weight). The military is not elected by anyone.  Therefore, its 
involvement in politics, even at a peripheral level, is a diminution of democratic accountability.  However, 
it also has other significant implications. The military might, for example, become involved in government 
because of an actual or created internal or external threat.  Such a situation would imply the distortion of 
government policy in order to meet this threat, for example by increasing the defense budget at the expense 
of other budget allocations. In some countries, the threat of military take-over can force an elected 
government to change policy or cause its replacement by another government more amenable to the 
military’s wishes. A military takeover or threat of a takeover may also represent a high risk if it is an 
indication that the government is unable to function effectively and that the country therefore has an uneasy 
environment for foreign businesses. A full-scale military regime poses the greatest risk. 
     Democratic Accountability (POL1) ICRG political risk sub-component (6% weight). This is a measure of how responsive government is to its 
people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government will fall, 
peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-democratic one. However, assessing 
democratic accountability is more complex than simply determining whether the country has free and fair 
elections.  Even democratically elected governments, particularly those that are apparently popular, can 
delude themselves into thinking they know what is good for their people even when the people have made 
it abundantly clear that they do not approve particular policies.  Therefore, it is possible for an accountable 




POL2 (Quality of Institutions) The sum of ICRG subcomponents: Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucratic Quality.
     Corruption (POL2) ICRG political risk sub-component (6% weight). This is a measure of corruption within the political 
system.  Such corruption: distorts the economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of 
government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than 
ability, and introduces an inherent instability into the political process. The most common form of 
corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and 
bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or 
loans.  Although the PRS measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or 
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favor-for-favors,” 
secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.  In PRS's view these sorts of 
corruption pose risk to foreign business, potentially leading to popular discontent, unrealistic and 
inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market.
     Law and Order (POL2) ICRG political risk sub-component (6% weight). PRS assesses Law and Order separately, with each sub-
component comprising zero to three points.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of 
the law.  Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating (3.0) in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating  (1.0) 
if the law is ignored for a political aim.
     Bureaucratic Quality (POL2) ICRG political risk sub-component (4% weight). The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy 
can act as a shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change.  
Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to 
govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services.  In these low-risk 
countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an 
established mechanism for recruitment and training.  Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong 
bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy 
formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.
POL3 (Socio-economic Conditions) The sum of ICRG subcomponents: Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, and Investment 
Profile.
     Government stability (POL3) ICRG political risk sub-component (12% weight). This is a measure both of the government’s ability to 
carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office.  This will depend on the type of 
governance, the cohesion of the government and governing party or parties, the closeness of the next 
election, the government’s command of the legislature, and popular approval of government policies.
     Socioeconomic Conditions (POL3) ICRG political risk sub-component (12% weight). This is an attempt to measure general public satisfaction, 
or dissatisfaction, with the government’s economic policies.  In general terms, the greater the popular 
dissatisfaction with a government’s policies, the greater the chances that the government will be forced to 
change direction, possibly to the detriment of business, or will fall. Socioeconomic conditions cover a 
broad spectrum of factors ranging from infant mortality and medical provision to housing and interest rates.  
Within this range different factors will have different weight in different societies.  PRS attempts to 
identify those factors that are important for the society in question, i.e. those with the greatest political 
impact, and assess the country on that basis.
     Investment Profile (POL3) ICRG political risk sub-component (12% weight). This is a measure of the government’s attitude to inward 
investment.  The investment profile is determined by PRS's assessment of three sub-components: (i) risk of 
expropriation or contract viability; (ii) payment delays; and (iii) repatriation of profits. Each sub-
component is scored on a scale  from zero [very high risk] to four [very low risk].Table 1
(Continued)
Variable Description
POL4 (Conflict) The sum of ICRG subcomponents: Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Religious Tensions, Ethnic 
Tensions.
     Internal Conflict (POL4) ICRG political risk sub-component (12% weight). This is an assessment of political violence in the country 
and its actual or potential impact on governance.  The highest rating is given to those countries where there 
is no armed opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct 
or indirect, against its own people.  The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil 
war. The intermediate ratings are awarded on the basis of whether the threat posed is to government and 
business or only business (e.g. kidnapping for ransom); whether acts of violence are carried out for a 
political objective (i.e. terrorist operations); whether such groups are composed of a few individuals with 
little support, or are well-organized movements operating with the tacit support of the people they purport 
to represent; whether acts of violence are sporadic or sustained; and whether they are restricted to a 
particular locality or region, or are carried out nationwide.  
     External Conflict (POL4) ICRG political risk sub-component (12% weight). The external conflict measure is an assessment of the 
risk to both the incumbent government and inward investment.  It ranges from trade restrictions and 
embargoes, whether imposed by a single country, a group of countries, or the whole international 
community, through geopolitical disputes, armed threats, exchanges of fire on borders, border incursions, 
foreign-supported insurgency, and full-scale warfare.
     Religion in Politics (POL4) ICRG political risk sub-component (6% weight). Religious tensions may stem from the domination of 
society and/or governance by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to 
exclude other religions from the political and/or social process; the desire of a single religious group to 
dominate governance; the suppression of religious freedom; the desire of a religious group to express its 
own identity, separate from the country as a whole. The risk involved in these situations range from 
inexperienced people imposing inappropriate policies through civil dissent to civil war.
     Ethnic Tensions (POL4) ICRG political risk sub-component (6% weight). This component measures the degree of tension within a 
country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.  Lower ratings are given to countries where 
racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to 
compromise.  Higher ratings are given to countries where tensions are minimal, even though such 
differences may still exist.
Financial development
Private credit/GDP Private credit divided by gross domestic product. Credit to private sector refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits 
and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  Available for all countries from 1980 
through 1997. Source: World Bank Development Indicators  CD-ROM.
Equity market turnover The ratio of equity market value traded to the market capitalization.  The data are available for 50 countries 





Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (English, French, 
Socialist, German, Scandinavian).  We construct three indicators that take the value of one when the legal 
origin is Anglo-Saxon (English Law), French (French Law), or other (Law Other), and zero otherwise; legal 
origin is available for all countries. This variable is purely cross-sectional, and available for all countries.  
Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
Judicial Efficiency Assessment of the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly 
foreign firms" produced by the country risk rating agency Business International Corp.  It may be taken to 
"represent investors' assessments of conditions in the country in question."  Average between 1980 and 
1983.  Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores, lower efficiency levels.  This variable is purely cross-
sectional, and available for 47 countries.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Speed of Judicial Process The total estimated speed in calendar days of the procedure (to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent or to 
collect a bounced check) under the factual and procedural assumptions provided. It equals the sum of (i) 
duration until completion of service of process, (ii) duration of trial, and (iii) duration of enforcement.  This 
variable is purely cross-sectional, and available for 69 countries.  Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
Investment environment
Economic risk rating The value of the the Political Risk Service (PRS) Group’s economic risk indicator (which ranges between 0 
and 50).  The risk rating is a combination of 5 subcomponents: GDP levels and growth, respectively, 
inflation, balanced budgets, and the current account.  The minimum number of points for each component 
is zero, while the maximum number of points depends on the fixed weight that component is given in the 
overall economics risk assessment.  
Anti-director rights Assessment of the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly 
foreign firms" produced by the country risk rating agency Business International Corp.  It may be taken to 
"represent investors' assessments of conditions in the country in question."  Average between 1980 and 
1983.  Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores, lower efficiency levels. This variable is purely cross-sectional, 
and available for 47 countries.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Creditor rights An index aggregating different creditor rights.  The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country 
imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganizations; (2) 
secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been 
approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that 
results from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the 
administration of its property pending the resolution of ther reorganization.  The index ranged from 0 to 4. 
This variable is purely cross-sectional, and available for 45 countries.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Accounting Standards Index created by examining and rating companies' 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 
items.  These items fall into seven categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, 
funds flow statements, accounting standards, stock data, and special items).  A minimum of three 
companies in each country were studied.   The companies represent a cross section of various industry 
groups; industrial companies represented 70 percent, and financial companies represented the remaining 30 












Real GDP growth (3-year) 0.0160 0.0265 ** 0.0201 -0.0016 ***
Real GDP growth (5-year) 0.0159 0.0276 ***
Real GDP growth (7-year) 0.0153 0.0264 ***
Govt/GDP 0.1379 0.1328 0.1885 0.1581 ***
Enrollment 0.5573 0.6115 ** 0.9974 0.3439 ***
Population Growth 0.0203 0.0169 ** 0.0060 0.0255 ***
Life Expectancy 65.7 67.7 ** 75.7 56.9 ***
Growth Opportunity -0.0301 0.0076 *** -0.0016 -0.0012
ICRG Political Index (75 countries) 0.5681 0.6494 *** 0.8384 0.5116 ***
  Pol1 (Political Conditions) 0.5855 0.6505 *** 0.9648 0.4542 ***
  Pol2 (Quality of Institutions) 0.5273 0.6033 *** 0.9333 0.4158 ***
  Pol3 (Socio-Economic) 0.4863 0.5472 *** 0.6534 0.4522 ***
  Pol4 (Conflict) 0.6671 0.7843 *** 0.9364 0.6350 ***
Trade/GDP 0.6229 0.6383 0.8429 0.6970 ***
Log(1+Inflation) (Latin) 0.1890 0.1411    NA    0.0596
Log(1+Inflation) (Not Latin) 0.0993 0.0857 0.0411 0.0934 ***
Log(1+Black Market Premium) 0.1499 0.0724 *** 0.0007 0.2211 ***
Fiscal Deficit (28 countries) 0.0606 0.0333 *** 0.0307    NA   
Private Credit/GDP 0.3831 0.4263 0.8095 0.2286 ***
Turnover (50 countries) 0.1814 0.2664 0.4938    NA   
Banking Crisis (systematic) 0.3243 0.2941 0.1131 0.3300 ***
Banking Crisis (systematic and borderline) 0.5243 0.5784 0.3891 0.4190
Law and Order (75 countries) 0.4875 0.6065 *** 0.9510 0.4472 ***
Insider Trading Law 0.4205 0.7241 *** 0.6540 0.0836 ***
Insider Trading Prosecution 0.0667 0.1149 * 0.4325    NA   
Judicial efficiency (47countries) 0.9456    NA   
Speed of process (checks+eviction) (69 countries) 408.3 363.4
ICRG Economic Index (75 countries) 0.5895 0.6765 *** 0.7845 0.5909
Investment profile  (75 countries) 0.4660 0.5312 *** 0.6494 0.4680 ***
Anti-director rights (47countries) 0.4902    NA   
Creditor rights (45 countries) 0.4853    NA   
Accounting standards (39 countries) 0.6950    NA   
We explore the 3, 5, and 7-year averages of the growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product and the 5-year 
averages of the other variables employed in the paper (and summarized in Table 1) before and after the equity market 
liberalization (including the liberalization year in the "after" period).  For some countries, we do not have a full 3, 5, or 7 
years available given the timing of the liberalization, so we simply take the available years in the average.  For all 
variables, unless otherwise stated, the summary statistics reflect data for 95 countries from 1980-1997.  Official 
liberalization means that the equity market is liberalized.  Fully Liberalized denotes countries that are fully liberalized 
throughout our sample, whereas Never Liberalized denotes countries that never undergo financial liberalization.  
Statistical significance is denoted by a * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.Table 3
Classic Growth Regressions and the Impact of Liberalization













No -0.0038 0.0014 0.0129
0.0043 0.0006 0.0023
No -0.0027 0.0021 -0.0362 0.0120
0.0043 0.0006 0.0134 0.0022
No 0.0157 -0.0033 0.0326 0.0092
0.0054 0.0010 0.0048 0.0022
No 0.0088 0.0005 -0.2671 0.0107
0.0061 0.0007 0.0886 0.0023
No -0.3550 -0.0082 0.1027 0.0116
0.0232 0.0008 0.0066 0.0019
No -0.3277 -0.0082 -0.0144 0.0004 -0.1911 0.0975 0.0097
0.0286 0.0010 0.0131 0.0048 0.0774 0.0076 0.0020
Yes not reported 0.0056
0.0012
Average of 3 separate regressions on non-overlapping 5-year periods
Yes not reported 0.0103
0.0014
I refers to a sample of 95 countries detailed in the data appendix.  For all estimates (except the last row), 
the dependent variable is the 5-year overlapping average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic 
product. Log(GDP) is the log real per capita GDP level in 1980. Govt/GDP is the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP; Enrollment is the secondary school enrollment ratio; Population growth is the 
growth rate of total population; Log(Life Expectancy) is the log life expectancy of the total population; 
and the official liberalization variable takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero 
otherwise.  
We first consider each control variable separately, then all together.  If the column denoted "fixed effects" 
contains a "No", we employ one constant since initial Log(GDP) is constant through time for each 
country.  If the column denoted "fixed effects" contains a "Yes", we drop the Log(GDP) and the other 
control variables, and include in the regressions, but do not report, fixed country effects.  In the last row, 
we report the simple average of 3 coefficients (and standard errors) associated with separate regressions 
(over 1981-1995, 1982-1996, and 1983-1997) for which the dependent variable is 3 non-overlapping 5-
year GDP average growth rates.  That is, each regression has three time-series observations with no 
overlap; we conduct each regression separately, and then average the resulting coefficients.  The weighting 
matrix we employ in our GMM estimation provides a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A: Growth Oppportunities C: Segmented Countries: Annual Average Real GDP growth
5-year average GDP growth Sample I II III IV 27 countries (5-year average growth) FE No FE
Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0092 0.0080 0.0087 0.0109 ICRG Political Index 0.0667 0.0279
   Std. error 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0042    Std. error 0.0173 0.0097
Growth Opportunties 0.0106 0.0101 0.0122 0.0167
   Std. error 0.0038 0.0040 0.0039 0.0046 POL1 (Political Conditions) -0.0209 0.0047
   Std. error 0.0096 0.0049
B: Probit Analysis: Predicting Liberalization POL2 (Quality of Institutions) 0.0178 0.0094
68 liberalizing and segmented countries Probit Est. Std. error    Std. error 0.0143 0.0057
Constant 10.45 12.81
Initial Log(GDP) -0.81 0.35 POL3 (Socio-Economic) -0.0148 0.0177
Gov/GDP -1.89 2.90    Std. error 0.0129 0.0105
Secondary-School Enrollment 6.30 2.67
Population Growth 11.19 25.80 POL4 (Conflict) 0.0798 0.0191
Log(Life) -2.76 3.28    Std. error 0.0114 0.0070
Past GDPGrowth 2.63 7.63
Growth Opportunities -16.84 7.94 D: Instrument Variables Estimation (Quality of Institutions)
Private Credit/GDP 3.49 1.74 5-year average GDP growth Sample II III IV
ICRG Political Index 5.53 2.48 Official Liberalization Indicator (GMM) 0.0081 0.0088 0.0108
   Std. error 0.0021 0.0021 0.0044
POL1 (Political) 1.88 1.15
Official Liberalization Indicator (GMM-IV) 0.0057 0.0099 0.0181
POL2 (Institutions) 5.79 1.91    Std. error 0.0022 0.0026 0.0051
POL3 (Socio-Economic) 4.07 2.20 ICRG Political Index 0.0035 0.0139 0.0528
   Std. error 0.0076 0.0102 0.0155
POL4 (Conflict) 2.27 1.93 Official Liberalization Indicator (GMM-IV) 0.0057 0.0085 0.0080
   Std. error 0.0023 0.0026 0.0045
POL4 (Conflict) -0.0088 -0.0078 0.0228
   Std. error 0.0056 0.0072 0.0123
Official Liberalization Indicator (GMM-IV) 0.0068 0.0088 0.0158
   Std. error 0.0022 0.0027 0.0049
I, II, III, and IV refer to samples of 95, 75, 50 and 28 countries detailed in data appendix.  In Panels A, C, and D, we report analysis from a regression which has the 5-year average
growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product as the dependent variable.  We report the coefficients for the official liberalization variable which takes a value of one when 
the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  In Panel A, we include in the regressions, but do not report, the same control variables as presented in the main regression of 
Table 3.  Further, we augment the control group to include a measure of implied growth opportunities detailed in Table 1. 
In Panel B, we present probit estimates, where the dependent variable takes a value of zero if the country never liberalizes and a one if the country liberalizes in sample; to focus on
the probability of the liberalization decision, we ignore countries that have liberalized before 1980.  We have 68 countries that either liberalize after 1980 or do not liberalize at all.  
For countries that liberalize, the right-hand-side predictive variables are averaged over the 5-years preceding liberalization; for those countries that do not liberalize, the right-hand-
side predictive variables are averaged over the 5-years preceding the liberalization date of their closest geographic neighbor.  As predictive variables, we include a constant, 
Log(GDP), Govt/GDP, secondary-school enrollment, population growth, Log(Life Expectancy), past GDP growth, a measure of industry growth opportunities, and private 
credit/GDP.  In addition, we consider one-by-one each of the political risk indicators.  Quasi-Maximum Likelihood adjusted standard errors are reported. 
In Panels C and D, we conduct growth regressions, where the dependent variable is the 5-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product.  In Panel C, to 
abstract from any liberalization effects, we focus solely on 27 segmented countries.  We present two sets of estimates: 1) when fixed effects are included (FE) but not reported, we 
regress growth on each political variable one-by-one with no additional controls; 2) when fixed effects are excluded (No FE), we include in the regressions, but do not report, the 
same control variables as presented in the main regression of Table 3.  In Panel D, for sample II, III, and IV (for which ICRG data are available, we reproduce our main GMM 
regression estimates from Table 3.  We employ an instrumental variables (IV) estimation within our GMM framework, where we use all the regressors as instruments, but 
instrument the liberalization indicator with the Pol2 (Quality of Institutions) Variable.  That is, we report the coefficient on the official liberalization variable that takes a value of 
one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise, but the liberalization indicator is instrumented by the quality of institutions for each country.  
For Panels A, C and D, the weighting matrix we employ in our GMM estimation provides a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  
All standard errors account for the overlapping nature of the data. Table 6
The Influence of the Reform Environment on Liberalization
Annual Average Real GDP growth (Five-year horizon)
A: Main GMM Liberalization Effect Sample I II III IV D: Law and Order & Insider Trading Sample I II III IV
Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0097 0.0081 0.0088 0.0108 Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0090 0.0070 0.0081
   Std. error 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0044    Std. error 0.0022 0.0020 0.0045
ICRG Law and Order -0.0001 0.0020 0.0028
   Std. error 0.0007 0.0008 0.0013
B: Macroeconomic Reforms Sample I II III IV
Trade 0.0074 0.0098 0.0100 0.0112 Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0087 0.0068 0.0080 0.0103
   Std. error 0.0014 0.0016 0.0017 0.0016    Std. error 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0043
Log(1+Inflation) (Latin) -0.0006 -0.0017 0.0008 0.0002 Insider Trading Law 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0007
   Std. error 0.0023 0.0024 0.0017 0.0030    Std. error 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0019
Log(1+Inflation) (Not Latin) 0.0092 0.0068 0.0127 -0.0244
   Std. error 0.0042 0.0047 0.0078 0.0201 Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0088 0.0072 0.0077 0.0098
Log(1+Black Market Premium) -0.0092 -0.0084 -0.0067 -0.0022 Std. error 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0044
   Std. error 0.0018 0.0020 0.0032 0.0069 Insider Trading Prosecution 0.0032 0.0027 0.0033 0.0022
Fiscal Deficit -0.0960 Std. error 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0023
0.0219
Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0074 0.0054 0.0066 0.0079 E: Banking Crises Sample I II III IV
   Std. error 0.0019 0.0020 0.0021 0.0040 During Systemic Crisis -0.0072 -0.0093 -0.0085 -0.0116
   Std. error 0.0014 0.0016 0.0015 0.0027
Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0094 0.0073 0.0084 0.0075
   Std. error 0.0021 0.0022 0.0020 0.0043
C: Financial Development Sample I II III IV
Private Credit 0.0125 0.0129 0.0084 0.0091 During Systemic and Borderline Crisis -0.0081 -0.0109 -0.0126 -0.0117
   Std. error 0.0031 0.0032 0.0032 0.0038    Std. error 0.0011 0.0013 0.0013 0.0018
Turnover 0.0152 0.0044 Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0101 0.0074 0.0081 0.0090
   Std. error 0.0026 0.0022    Std. error 0.0019 0.0020 0.0021 0.0039
Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0077 0.0061 0.0069 0.0091
   Std. error 0.0020 0.0020 0.0019 0.0043 Post Systemic Crisis 0.0058 0.0069 0.0022 -0.0032
   Std. error 0.0019 0.0022 0.0027 0.0048
Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0097 0.0083 0.0087 0.0109
   Std. error 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0043
Post Systemic and Borderline Crisis 0.0056 0.0065 0.0062 0.0056
   Std. error 0.0014 0.0016 0.0017 0.0021
Official Liberalization Indicator 0.0091 0.0076 0.0076 0.0097
   Std. error 0.0020 0.0022 0.0021 0.0044
I, II, III, and IV refer to samples of 95, 75, 50 and 28 countries detailed in data appendix.  We report analysis from a regression which has the 5-year average growth rate of real per capita 
gross domestic product as the dependent variable. We include in the regressions, but do not report, the same control variables as presented in the main regression of Table 3.  We report the 
coefficients for the official liberalization variable which takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise. ; we reproduce the main liberalization effect in panel A.  
In panel B, we augment the control group to include: the openness of the trade sector measured by the sum of exports plus imports divided by GDP, the log of one plus the level of inflation, 
the log of one plus the level of the black market premium for foreign exchange and the size of the government deficit.  In Panel C, we consider financial development variables: the ratio of 
private credit to GDP, which is a banking development indicator, and the value of trading scaled by market capitalization. 
In Panel D, we also consider Law and Order (higher values denoting improvements, rescaled to fall between 0 and 1) taken from ICRG, and Insider Trading Law and Insider Trading 
Prosecution, which are indicators representing either the introduction of  laws prohibiting insider trading or actual prosecutions, respectively.  In Panel E, we include two indicators of banking 
crises: systemic and systemic and borderline. In the first case, we introduce a dummy variable that is set to one during a banking crisis contemporaneously with the left-hand side variable.  In 
the second case, we add a variable that takes on a value of one after a banking crisis.  The weighting matrix we employ in our GMM estimation provides a correction for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity.  All standard errors account for the overlapping nature of the data.Table 7
Why does the growth effect from liberalizations differ across countries?  
Annual Average Real GDP growth (Five-year horizon)
A: Liberalization Intensity Sample I II III IV
Intensity Indicator A 0.0107 0.0087 0.0132 0.0130
   Std. error 0.0023 0.0025 0.0029 0.0048
Intensity Indicator B 0.0115 0.0115 0.0174 0.0168
   Std. error 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028 0.0046


















Private Credit 0.0084 0.0048 0.0105 *** 0.0116 ** 95 Yes
Turnover 0.0134 0.0017 0.0094 *** 0.0152 *** 50 Yes
Legal environment
French vs. English law 0.0072 0.0068 0.0124 ** 95 No
Other vs. English law 0.0072 0.0097 0.0124 95 No
Judicial efficiency 0.0105 0.0069 0.0099 0.0057 47 No
Speed of process (combined) 0.0065 0.0029 0.0084 -0.0002 69 No
Investment conditions/protection
ICRGE 0.0049 0.0071 0.0075 0.0696 *** 75 Yes
Investment profile 0.0060 0.0019 0.0085 *** 0.0210 *** 75 Yes
Anti-director rights 0.0117 0.0018 0.0089 ** 0.0084 *** 47 No
Creditor rights 0.0102 0.0035 0.0089 0.0190 *** 45 No
Accounting standards 0.0094 0.0004 0.0110 *** 0.0058 39 No
I, II, III, and IV refer to samples of 95, 75, 50 and 28 countries detailed in the data appendix.  We report analysis from a regression which has the 5-
year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product as the dependent variable. We include in the regressions, but do not report, the same 
control variables as presented in Table 2. In Panel A, Intensity Measure A is the ratio of IFC Investables to Global market capitalization. Intensity 
Measure B is the ratio of IFC Investables to Global number of companies.  
In Panel B, for each interaction variable, we separately conduct regressions which have the 5-year average growth rate of real per capita gross 
domestic product as the dependent variable.  We include in the regressions the same control variables as presented in Table 2.  We also separate the 
liberalization effect for fullly liberalized and liberalizing countries.  For liberalizing countries, we estimate interaction effects with the financial 
development, legal, and investment condition variables; we report the associated impact on GDP growth for a liberalizing country for a low level 
(below the median of the associated interaction variable for liberalizing countries) and for a liberalizing country at a high level (above the median of 
the associated interaction variable for liberalizing countries).  We provide the significance of a Wald test, for which the null hypothesis is that the high-
low effects are equivalent.  We also report the statistical significance of the interaction coefficient; statistical significance is denoted by a * for 10%, ** 
for 5%, and *** for 1%.  
The financial development variables we consider are the ratio of private credit to GDP and equity market turnover.  The legal environment variables 
we consider are legal origin (English, French, or "other"), judicial efficiency, and the combined speed of the process to resolve a bounced check or 
tenant eviction (longer duration implies a lower speed).  For all interaction indices, larger values denote improvements.  The investment conditions 
variables we consider are a measure of economic risk, the investment profile, anti-director (minority shareholders) rights, creditor rights, and 
accounting standards.  The number of countries for which the interaction variable is available is also provided.  Finally, some of the variables are 
available as time-series, while others are only available in the cross-section; we denote this in the column laballed "time-series available".  The 
weighting matrix we employ in our GMM estimation provides a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  All standard errors account for the 
overlapping nature of the data.  Appendix A
Dating Equity Market Liberalization
Official Liberalization Year of First ADR  Year of First Country
Country Year Introduction Fund Introduction
Argentina (ARG) 1989 1991 1991
Bangladesh (BGD) 1991 n/a n/a
Botswana (BWA) 1990 n/a n/a
Brazil (BRA) 1991 1992 1987
Chile (CHL) 1992 1990 1989
Colombia (COL) 1991 1992 1992
Cote d'Voire (CIV) 1995 n/a n/a
Ecuador (ECU) 1994 1994* n/a
Egypt (EGY) 1992 1996* n/a
Ghana (GHA) 1993 1995* n/a
Greece (GRC) 1987 1988 1988
Iceland (ISL) 1991 n/a n/a
India (IND) 1992 1992 1986
Indonesia (IDN) 1989 1991 1989
Israel (ISR) 1993 1987* 1992
Jamaica (JAM) 1991 1993* n/a
Japan (JPN) 1983 before 1980 n/a
Jordan (JOR) 1995 1997* n/a
Kenya (KEN) 1995 n/a n/a
Korea (KOR) 1992 1990 1984
Malaysia (MYS) 1988 1992 1987
Malta (MLT) 1992 1998* n/a
Mauritius (MUS) 1994 n/a n/a
Mexico (MEX) 1989 1989 1981
Morocco (MAR) 1988 1996* n/a
New Zealand (NZL) 1987 1983* n/a
Nigeria (NGA) 1995 1998* n/a
Oman (OMN) 1999 n/a n/a
Pakistan (PAK) 1991 1994* 1991
Peru (PER) 1992 1994* n/a
Philippines (PHL) 1991 1991 1987
Portugal (PRT) 1986 1990 1987
Saudi Arabia (SAU) 1999 n/a 1997
South Africa (ZAF) 1996 1994* 1994
Spain (ESP) 1985 1988* n/a
Sri Lanka (LKA) 1991 1994* n/a
Taiwan (TWN) 1991 1991 1986
Thailand (THA) 1987 1991 1985
Trinidad & Tobago (TTO) 1997 n/a n/a
Tunisia (TUN) 1995 1998* n/a
Turkey (TUR) 1989 1990 1989
Venezuela (VEN) 1990 1991 n/a
Zimbabwe (ZWE) 1993 n/a n/a
The official liberalization dates, date of first ADR issuance, and first country fund are based on Bekaert and Harvey (2000), augmented here to 
include 10 additional emerging markets, plus Iceland, Japan, Malta, New Zealand and Spain.  For countries with a *, we obtain "effective dates" from
the Bank of New York (http://www.adrbny.com).  Note, the other ADR "announcement" dates are from Miller's (1999); however, he notes that the  
announcement usually only preceeds the issue by 40 days, on average.  For South Africa, the first ADR introduction date is associated with the post-
apartheid period; there were many ADRs in the early 1980's which we ignore. All other countries are considered fully liberalized (industrialized) or 
fully segmented (less developed) from 1980-1997.  n/a represents not available; either ADR or country funds (or reliable dates) are not available.  
Taiwan (TWN) does not enter the samples employed in this paper.Appendix B
Data Sample Inclusion
Country Code Samples Country Code Samples Country Code Samples
Algeria DZA I,II Greece GRC I,II,III,IV Nigeria NGA I,II,III
Argentina ARG I,II,III,IV Guatemala GTM I,II Norway NOR I,II,III,IV
Australia AUS I,II,III,IV Guyana GUY I Oman OMN I,II
Austria AUT I,II,III,IV Haiti HTI I Pakistan PAK I,II,III
Bangladesh BGD I,II,III Honduras HND I,II Paraguay PRY I,II
Belgium BEL I,II,III,IV Iceland ISL I,II Peru PER I,II
Barbados BRB I India IND I,II,III,IV Philippines PHL I,II,III
Benin BEN I Indonesia IDN I,II,III Portugal PRT I,II,III
Botswana BWA I Iran IRN I,II Rwanda RWA I
Brazil BRA I,II,III,IV Ireland IRL I,II,III,IV Saudi Arabia SAU I,II
Burkina Faso BFA I Israel ISR I,II,III Senegal SEN I,II
Cameroon CMR I,II Italy ITA I,II,III,IV Sierra Leone SLE I,II
Canada CAN I,II,III,IV Jamaica JAM I,II,III Singapore SGP I,II,III,IV
Central African Rep. CAF I Japan JPN I,II,III,IV South Africa ZAF I,II,III,IV
Chad TCD I Jordan JOR I,II,III Spain ESP I,II,III,IV
Chile CHL I,II,III,IV Kenya KEN I,II,III Sri Lanka LKA I,II,III
Colombia COL I,II,III Korea, Rep. KOR I,II,III,IV Swaziland SWZ I
Congo, Rep. COG I,II Kuwait KWT I,II Sweden SWE I,II,III,IV
Costa Rica CRI I,II Lesotho LSO I Switzerland CHE I,II,III,IV
Cote d'Ivoire CIV I,II,III Madagascar MDG I Syria SYR I,II
Denmark DNK I,II,III,IV Malawi MWI I,II Thailand THA I,II,III,IV
Dominican Rep. DOM I,II Malaysia MYS I,II,III,IV Togo TGO I
Ecuador ECU I,II Mali MLI I Trinidad & Tobago TTO I,II,III
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY I,II,III Malta MLT I Tunisia TUN I,II,III
El Salvador SLV I,II Mauritius MUS I,II Turkey TUR I,II,III
Fiji FJI I Mexico MEX I,II,III,IV United Kingdom GBR I,II,III,IV
Finland FIN I,II,III Morocco MAR I,II,III United States USA I,II,III,IV
France FRA I,II,III,IV Nepal NPL I Uruguay URY I,II
Gabon GAB I,II Netherlands NLD I,II,III,IV Venezuela VEN I,II,III
Gambia GMB I New Zealand NZL I,II,III Zambia ZMB I,II
Germany DEU I,II,III,IV Nicaragua NIC I,II Zimbabwe ZWE I,II,III,IV
Ghana GHA I Niger NER I
This table reports the countries employed in this study.  Sample I includes 95 countries, Sample II includes 75 countries, Sample III includes 50 countries, and 
Sample IV includes 28 countries. Appendix C
Monte Carlo Analysis of the Liberalization Effect










This Table presents evidence from a Monte Carlo procedure (with 1000 replications) that 
mimics the GMM estimation presented in Table 2, for our largest sample of 95 countries.  
The dependent variable is the 5-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic 
product. The independent variables are the ones used in Table 2 but the liberalization 
variable is randomized using the procedure documented in the text.  The weighting matrix we 
employ in our GMM estimation provides a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  
We present the 2.5%, 5.0%, 50%, 95%, and 97.5% percentile for the estimated coefficients 
and t-statistics on the liberalization coefficient.  50
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